



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

of unity is unknown, and the unitary self can not be isolated from experience, what is this but entropy in the field of knowledge?

PHILIP HYATT TARR.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Skepticism of the Instrument. H. G. WELLS. *Mind*, July, 1904, pp. 379-393.

This paper was read before the Oxford Philosophical Society, November 8, 1903. It presents the philosophical foundations of one who would, if he did not feel this a 'quite preposterous modesty,' call himself a mere amateur in philosophy. According to his own account, the youthful training of Mr. Wells was entirely scientific and objective, and he came to reflect deliberately upon philosophical problems through the studies of educational method and theory, of logic and psychology that he made in preparing to take a teaching diploma. His studies of comparative anatomy and of evolution led him to regard all human powers as imperfect 'compromises and adaptations,' and this view still dominates him when he comes to the study of logic, causing him to mistrust seriously the efficacy of its methods as a means of attaining a correct view of objective facts. He is skeptical of the instrument on three counts. First, it proceeds by classification, and he doubts the objective reality of all classification. Things, in point of fact, are unique. Thought, working by classes, is continually in error. When its objects are near at hand, it can correct its errors by the check of practical results, but in philosophical or theological matters there can be no such check, hence it is like 'firing at an inaccessible, unmarkable and indestructible target with a defective rifle and variable cartridges.' A second count against logic is that it constantly thinks the negative as though it were something positive and real and full of meaning, whereas it is just that vague unknown which thought can not fathom. In consequence the mind is not justified in dealing with it as though it had positive content and value. Lastly, our ideas are on different levels, and when we attempt to deal with the same object by methods of thinking that are not on the same level, contradiction arises. It would be absurd to speak of cutting an atom in two with a knife. The atom is an object of conception, the knife of ordinary sensuous experience. The two ways of thinking are not to be fitted together thus. Now human logic is continually liable to just such absurdities, as witness the conflict between the theories of freedom and predestination.

Mr. Wells does not hesitate to extend his skepticism to morals and religion. There is no universal validity for human thought. One result of great value springs, Mr. Wells thinks, from this view. It is that the good and the sacred become more a matter of individual taste and judgment, 'ethical, social and religious teaching' is brought 'into the province of poetry,' and our sense of humor can rejoice in profound contradictions instead of being confined to petty issues. One may well feel that such an attitude, however diverting to a temporary mood, is hardly destined to be accepted by human intelligence as permanently satisfactory.

The scientific agnosticism of Mr. Wells is current, but he supplements it by some criticisms of logic that are used in a fresh and suggestive way. His acceptance of 'objective facts' without criticism of their constitution and meaning is naïve. On the whole, his view seems largely negative; so much so that he seems scarcely justified in regarding it as pragmatism, although it is big with possibilities in that direction.

E. N. HENDERSON.

ADELPHI COLLEGE.

Nietzsches Lehre in ihren Grundbegriffen. Die ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen und der Sinn des Übermenschen, Eine kritische Untersuchung. OSCAR EWALD. Berlin, Ernst Hofmann & Co., 1903. 141 pp.

There are two classes of books concerning the doctrines of any given thinker: those that do and those that do not presuppose on the part of the reader a knowledge of the subject in question. The present monograph belongs to the first class; it can hardly fail to be of value to anyone already familiar with Nietzsche's writings, it is practically useless as an introduction to them. There is much criticism but little exposition and the former is essentially constructive. What Nietzsche himself may have thought is subordinated to what in the author's opinion consistency and the logical consequences of his ideas demanded that he should think. The special doctrines chosen for consideration are the Overman and the Eternal Recurrence. These are represented as at first sight contradictions, in that the one posits constant development, the other constant return to previous stages. The final interpretation reconciles the seeming conflict by giving a symbolic meaning to both doctrines, of which the Recurrence thus becomes the esoteric form of the Overman. Both are ideals proposed to the will, not as some hard and fast product of future evolution, but as the formal end set for individual endeavor. The meaning of life as embodied in the Overman is no definite achievement but the constant readiness to surpass the man; and even more than the Overman the Eternal Recurrence is a symbol, never to be regarded in the light of actual physical events. The greatest possible test of the active will is the readiness to regard its activity as altogether limitless. Complete affirmation of life wills not merely for to-day but for countless ages without the shadow of change, nay, looks upon itself as altogether outside of time. This interpretation is not the usual one and Herr Ewald, while maintaining that it is based upon Nietzsche's writings, points out himself the many passages that contradict it; but in a study of philosophy rather than of a philosopher such a rejection of unsuitable portions of the text is admissible. The result might perhaps be regarded as a contribution to the prevailing voluntaristic philosophy, and, viewed from this aspect, has the merit of approaching the subject from a fresh standpoint. Its chief excellence as a Nietzsche-commentary is, in the reviewer's opinion, the energy with which all affinity between Nietzsche and Darwin is denied. In spite of the widespread tendency to regard Nietzsche's theories as the extension and application of the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest, such an interpretation is based upon